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Abstract	
Approaches	to	depoliticisation	have	tended	to	focus	on	its	use	as	a	domestic	strategy.	The	purpose	of	
depoliticisation,	 whether	 discourse-,	 rule-,	 or	 institution-based,	 is	 to	 distance	 or	 limit	 the	 political	
character	of	a	particular	issue	or	policy.	Where	the	literature	on	depoliticisation	tends	to	be	lacking	is	
in	its	international	role.	This	paper	seeks	to	explore	how	imperialist	policies,	that	is	policies	intended	
to	dominate	one	state	by	another,	have	been	depoliticized	by	being	channeled	through	technically-
managed	 or	 apparently	 economic	 institutions.	 The	 paper	 situates	 an	 account	 of	 depoliticisation	 in	
terms	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 global	 capitalist	 society,	 and	 seeks	 to	 explore	 how	 imperial	 strategy	 was	
depoliticized	through	the	Sterling	Area.	The	paper	looks	at	an	episode	in	British-Malayan	relations	in	
which	 the	 apolitical	 character	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 is	 brought	 into	 question.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	
strategy	 of	 depoliticisation,	 as	with	 its	 domestic	 instances,	 is	 to	 remove	 accountability	 from	 state	
managers,	provide	them	with	greater	governing	autonomy	and	to	limit	social	instability,	while	at	the	
same	time	trying	to	remove	barriers	for	capital	accumulation	on	a	global	scale.	
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Introduction	
The	concept	of	depoliticisation	has	found	considerable	traction	in	recent	years,	especially	 in	the	
study	of	British	domestic	 politics.	 This	 has	generally	 been	placed	 in	 terms	of	 the	 contradictory	
nexus	within	which	state	management	exists:	between	accumulation	and	legitimation.	Moreover,	
it	 has	 been	 further	 categorised	 into	 institutional,	 rules-based	 and	 discourse	 depoliticisations	
(Flinders	&	Buller	2006).		Authors	have	looked	at	historical	moments	of	depoliticisation,	from	the	
return	to	the	Gold	Standard	(Kettell	2004)	to	IMF	conditionality	 in	1976	(Rogers	2012)	up	to	the	
present	 day,	 including	 the	 ERM	 (Kettell	 2009),	 the	 operational	 independence	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	 (Burnham	 2001),	 the	 discourse	 of	 globalization	 (Hay	 &	 Watson	 1999)	 and	 even	 the	
gendered	discourse	surrounding	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England	(Clarke	&	Roberts	2014).i	
	 The	 impetus	 that	 drives	 a	 depoliticized	 form	 of	 state	 management	 has	 focused	 on	
changes	 in	 international	 finance	 (Burnham	 2001)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 perceptions	 of	 both	 state	
managers	and	their	audience	(Flinders	&	Buller	2006).	Generally	speaking,	this	audience	has	been	
the	 electorate	 of	 the	 state	 in	 question,	 and	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 national	 interest	 (Burnham	
2001,	 128;	 Kettell	 2008,	 631).	 This	 way	 of	 understanding	 depoliticizing	 moves,	 focusing	 on	
domestic	policy,	has	totally	dominated	the	literature	on	the	subject.		
	 Lacking	 from	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 on	 depoliticisation	 is	 an	 appreciation	 of	 how	 the	
target	 audience	 of	 a	 depoliticizing	move	may	 not	 be	 a	 domestic	 one	 but	may	 instead	 be	 the	
population	of	other	states,	or	even	other	state	managers.	 In	other	words,	what	 is	missing	 from	
this	literature	is	an	appreciation	of	how	depoliticisation	is	used	as	a	tool	in	international	economic	
policy.	While	all	authors	on	this	subject	have	highlighted	the	international	dimension	and	origins	
of	a	depoliticized	form	of	state	management,ii	they	have	not	attempted	to	understand	how	states	
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consider	the	impact	of	their	own	policies	on	an	audience	outside	their	own	territories.	It	is	this	gap	
that	this	paper	will	seek	to	address.	
	 The	paper,	offering	an	open	Marxist	account	of	the	state,	will	begin	with	an	analysis	of	the	
nature	of	the	global	economy	within	which	states	formulate	policy	and	conduct	themselves.	This	
section	 will	 seek	 to	 emphasise	 how	 this	 context	 gives	 rise	 not	 only	 to	 the	 tendency	 towards	
depoliticisation	but	also	imperialism.	This	paper	takes	the	view	that	depoliticisation	is	a	means	by	
which	 the	 state	 is	 able	 to	 displace	 the	 political	 character	 of	 government	 policy	 or	 social	
conditions,	 thereby	diminishing	the	possibility	 that	state	managers	will	be	held	accountable	 for	
unpopular	decisions.	Imperialism,	on	the	other	hand,	is	taken	as	a	strategy	through	which	a	state	
is	able	to	manage	the	contradictions	of	capitalist	society	through	commandeering	the	capacity	of	
another	state	to	act	in	the	interests	of	capital-in-general.	
The	 next	 section	 seeks	 to	 provide	 a	 space	 within	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 on	
depoliticisation	 to	 incorporate	 a	 non-domestic	 public	 as	 an	 audience,	 and	 to	 explain	why	 state	
managers	 would	 seek	 to	 depoliticise	 a	 strategy	 of	 imperialism.	 The	 same	 basis	 applies	 to	
depoliticisation	 internationally	 as	 domestically	 and	 so	 the	 state,	 in	 its	 perpetual	 quest	 for	
economic	 growth,	 which	 is	 always	 conducted	 on	 an	 international	 scale,	 must	 consider	 the	
consequences	this	has	for	its	own	legitimacy	also	on	an	international	scale.	
	 The	paper’s	penultimate	section	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	structures	of	the	Sterling	
Area	as	a	basis	for	British	international	economic	policy.	The	final	section	offers	an	analysis	of	an	
incident	 in	 British-Malayan	 relations	 in	 1955.	 This	 episode	 revolves	 around	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	
Chief	Minister	of	Singapore	to	use	the	renewal	of	exchange	control	laws	as	a	political	weapon	in	
future	independence	negotiations.	The	sources	derive	from	National	and	Bank	of	England	Archive	
documents,	 including	documents	from	the	so-called	 ‘Migrated	Archives’	that	have	only	recently	
been	made	public.	
These	final	two	sections	will	argue	that	the	Sterling	Area	not	only	acted	as	a	mechanism	
for	 Britain	 to	 achieve	 its	 international	 economic	 and	 political	 goals	 but	 also	 provided	 a	means	
through	which	British	imperial	economic	policy	could	be	presented	as	an	apparently	neutral	and	
technocratic	 institution.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 was	 a	 method	 through	 which	 Britain	 sought	 to	
legitimize	 its	 own	 strategy	 for	 accumulation.	 As	 such,	 this	 paper	 will	 argue	 that	 this	 incident	
reveals	how	the	British	state	was	able	to	depoliticise	imperialism.	
	
Accumulation	and	Legitimation	
A	brief	glance	at	the	literature	on	depoliticisation	provides	an	impression	of	a	beleaguered	state.	
Indeed,	 the	 common	 understanding	 of	 depoliticisation	 derives	 from	 seeing	 the	 state	 as	 the	
overtly	political	 form	of	an	 inherently	contradictory	society	 (Burnham	2001,	2006;	Kettell	2004,	
2006,	2008;	Rogers	2009a,	2009b,	2012).	In	essence,	the	state,	as	Simon	Clarke	(1983,	118)	notes,	
is	a	regulatory	agency	required	to	sustain	capitalist	society	 in	the	face	of	 its	crisis-prone	nature.	
This	has	been	described	as	functionalist	but	need	not	necessarily	be	seen	as	such.iii	As	Burnham	
(1994,	6;	2006,	75)	points	out,	the	organizational	approach	to	the	state,	from	which	this	view	of	
depoliticisation	 derives,	 focuses	 instead	 on	 the	 social	 origins	 of	 the	 state	 from	which	 its	 social	
function	can	then	be	understood.	It	 is	from	understanding	the	state	as	a	form	of	social	relations	
we	can	then	shed	light	on	how	and	why	the	state	behaves	in	the	way	that	it	appears	to.	This	view	
of	the	state	derives	from	Marx’s	own	emphasis	on	the	material	basis	of	society.	
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‘Neither	 legal	 relations	 nor	 political	 forms	 [can]	 be	 comprehended	 whether	 by	
themselves	or	on	 the	basis	of	 a	 so-called	general	 development	of	 the	human	mind,	
but	that	on	the	contrary	they	originate	in	the	material	conditions	of	life…	the	anatomy	
of	 this	 civil	 society,	 however,	 has	 to	 be	 sought	 in	 political	 economy.’	 (Marx	 [1859]	
1971,	20)	
	 The	state,	in	this	view,	is	indistinguishable	from	capitalist	society.	It	is	a	manifestation	of	
capitalism’s	own	contradictions,	which	cannot	be	solved	but	only	managed.	As	Burnham	(2014,	
190)	notes,	 the	origins	of	 the	capitalist	state	ultimately	 lie	 in	 the	separation	of	 the	political	and	
economic	 spheres	 of	 human	 social	 life,	 which	 distinguishes	 it	 from	 states	 in	 other	 epochs	 of	
history.	 The	 most	 fundamental	 contradiction	 for	 the	 capitalist	 state	 to	 manage	 is	 to	 seek	 an	
impossible	 reconciliation	 between	 two	 goals:	 accumulation	 and	 legitimation	 (Offe	 1975,	 26;	
Rogers	 2009b,	 636).	 These	 two	 contradictory	 functions	 derive	 from	 the	 crisis-prone	 nature	 of	
capitalist	social	relations	themselves.	On	the	one	hand,	the	state	must	seek	to	maintain	the	circuit	
of	capital,	 for	this	 is	not	 just	how	the	rich	become	richer	but	how	society	as	a	whole	 is	clothed,	
fed,	 sheltered	 and	 so	 forth.	However,	 capitalist	 production	 relies	 on	 the	 exploitation	of	 labour.	
The	circuit	of	capital	does	not	simply	provide,	 it	also	 immiserates.	Ever	greater	 levels	of	surplus	
value	are	sought	and	extracted	from	workers,	wages	are	pushed	down,	overproduction	develops	
and	 crises	 occur.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 very	 basis	 of	 capitalist	 production	 and	 accumulation	
undermines	itself,	delegitimizing	the	state	and	imperiling	the	order	of	society	itself.	However,	the	
state’s	 capacity	 to	 remedy	 this	 also	 undermines	 capitalist	 accumulation:	 by	 raising	 taxes,	
regulating	 the	 labour	market,	 expanding	welfare	provision,	 etc.	 all	 go	 some	way	 to	 imposing	a	
limit	on	the	capacity	of	capital	to	self-valorise.	
	 The	contradictory	nexus	within	and	through	which	the	state	exists	provides	the	context	for	
understanding	how	 state	managers	 formulate	policy.	 Imperialism,	 as	with	depoliticisation,	 also	
emerges	 directly	 from	 these	 conditions;	 however,	 this	 is	 always	 under	 specific	 and	 highly	
contingent	 historical	 circumstances.	 It	 is	 no	 surprise,	 then,	 that	 accounts	 of	 imperialism	 have	
varied	 substantially	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 Century.	 The	 earlier	 ‘Classical’	 approaches	
understood	 imperialism	 as	 a	 seizure	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus	 by	 a	 particular	 fraction	 of	 capital,	
usually	finance	capital,	in	order	to	compel	territorial	conquest.iv	These	accounts	can	be,	and	have	
been,	criticized	for	their	reliance	on	their	 instrumentalisation	of	the	state	as	a	kind	of	 ‘capitalist	
trust’	(Burnham	1998,	190;	Sutton	2013,	221-225).	These	accounts	also	suggest	that	imperialism	is	
a	 distinct	 period	of	 capitalist	 development,	which	 lays	 them	open	 to	 criticism	as	deterministic,	
ahistorical	and	with	 little	account	 for	 social	 change	 (Clarke	1992,	 149;	Sutton	2013,	225).v	More	
recent	approaches	offered	the	‘sociological’	idea	that	imperialism	is	only	conducted	by	a	distinct	
‘core’-type	of	state	in	order	to	exploit	the	‘periphery’-type	of	state	(Burnham	1998,	190);	however,	
these	accounts	remain	problematic	in	that	their	typology	of	states	fetishizes	the	state-form	along	
the	national	lines	through	which	it	appears	thus	diminishing	the	need	for	concrete	and	historical	
analysis	of	inter-state	relations	(Burnham	1998,	196;	Sutton	2013,	226).vi		
Instead,	 this	 paper	 situates	 both	 its	 approach	 to	 depoliticisation	 and	 imperialism	 in	 an	
open	Marxist	understanding	of	capitalist	 social	 relations.	This	approach	 ‘sees	 relations	between	
national	 states	 in	 terms	of	 the	 social	 relationships	which	 constitutes	 states	 as	moments	 of	 the	
global	composition	of	class	relations’	(Burnham	1998,	194-5).	As	such,	the	paper	adopts	the	view	
that	 imperialism	 is	 not	 an	 essential	 or	 pre-determined	 characteristic	 or	 stage	 of	 capitalism,	 a	
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unitary	entity	or	institution,	or	even	of	a	type	of	state,	but	is	a	strategy	available,	under	particular	
circumstances,	to	state	managers	in	order	to	manage	those	contradictions	inherent	to	capitalist	
society	(Sutton	2013).		
The	strategy	of	imperialism	not	only	provides	a	means	for	the	state	to	pursue	the	interests	
of	 capital-in-general,	 and	 to	 sustain	 the	 national	 and	 global	 circuit	 of	 capital,	 but	 it	 also	 takes	
advantage	 of	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	 domestic/international	 split	 that	 characterizes	 capitalist	
society.	Rather	than	taking	place	in	the	domestic	sphere	of	politics	apparently	‘within’	the	state,	
imperialism	creates	a	particular	 relationship	between	 states.	 It	 is	also	essentially	political.	 In	 the	
parlance	 of	 political	 economists,	 economic	 historians	 and	 public	 policy	 researchers,	 it	 can	 be	
considered	a	 form	of	 international	economic	policy	 (Schenk	1994;	Krozewski	2001;	Hinds	2001;	
Strange;	Burnham	2000;	2006;	Sutton	2015).	This	international	economic	policy	is	formulated	in	
the	 exact	 same	 nexus	 as	 all	 other	 policy	 and	 as	much	 for	 domestic	 reasons	 as	 international	 –	
whatever	that	distinction	may	mean	(Burnham	1998,	191;	Kettell	&	Sutton	2013).		
	 This	shift	to	an	international	arena,	however,	appears	to	transcend	the	boundaries	of	mere	
domestic	politics,	shifting	policy	to	an	apparently	apolitical	realm.	While	state	managers	are	still	
prone	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 statecraft,	 as	 identified	 by	 Bulpitt	 (1986,	 21),	 of	 achieving	 ‘some	
necessary	degree	of	governing	competence’,	it	does	not	summon	the	problems	of	delegitimation	
that	a	similar	domestic	policy	might.	This	is	true	for	the	simple	reason	that,	while	accumulation	is	
to	the	benefit	of	the	state	conducting	the	imperial	policy,	the	ensuing	contradictions	themselves	
are	transposed	to	another	state’s	territory.	
	 To	 see	 a	 strategy	 of	 imperialism	 as	 having	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 depoliticised	 is	
straightforward	enough	–	the	role	that	the	international	realm	as	an	apparent	source	of	external	
discipline	 plays	 in	 the	 legitimation	 of	 state	 policy	 has	 been	well	 studied	 (Hay	 &	Watson	 1999;	
Rogers	2009a,	2009b).	However,	as	with	any	state	policy,	the	contradictions	of	capital	have	not	
been	 solved,	 they	 have	 only	 been	 temporarily	managed.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 imperialism,	 they	 have	
merely	been	geographically	shifted	(Harvey	2003;	2007).		
In	effect,	one	state,	A,	has	coopted	the	capacity	of	another	state,	B,	to	act	in	the	interests	
of	 capital-in-general	 and	 to	ensure	 that	 conditions	 for	 valorization	are	more	 suitable	 in	 its	own	
territory	than	in	B’s.	Exploitation	and	immiseration	are	therefore	shifted	to	state	B	while	surplus	
value	 pours	 into	 A.	 State	 B,	 therefore,	 find	 its	 governing	 autonomy	 and	 potential	 for	 action	
increasingly	 limited	as	 all	 the	 contradictions	of	 capitalism	coalesce	 in	 its	 territory,	 endangering	
the	very	basis	of	this	unequal	relationship.		
	 There	 are	 two	 aspects	 of	 how	 imperialism	 can	 generate	 undesirable	 consequences	 for	
state	managers.	 Firstly,	 not	 only	 can	 state	B	 find	 itself	 prone	 to	 all	manner	of	 fallout	 from	 the	
imperialist	policies	of	state	A,	the	state	managers	of	state	B	can	be	aware	of	this.	This	can	cause	
severe	obstacles	for	the	actions	of	state	A	in	conducting	its	international	economic	policy	as	the	
state	managers	of	state	B	will	seek	to	redevelop	their	own	autonomy	of	action	over	state	policy.	
Secondly,	the	people	of	state	B,	aware	of	state	A’s	actions	and	the	consequences	of	such	in	their	
own	 territory,	 may	 become	 aggravated	 or	 aggrieved,	 leading	 to	 social	 unrest,	 governmental	
change,	and	demand	a	fundamental	change	in	the	relationship	between	the	two	states.	As	such,	
state	 A	might	 find	 it	 prudent	 to	 present	 this	 policy	 as	 not	 just	 inevitable	 but	 as	 in	 some	 way	
neutral,	 a	 technocratic	decision	or	 even	benign.	This	 can	 transform	 the	appearance	of	 imperial	
policy	 into	 something	 much	 more	 palatable.	 This,	 then,	 is	 the	 basis	 through	 which	 state	
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managers	would	 seek	 to	depoliticise	 imperialism.	However,	 it	 also	 reveals	 the	audiences	 that	a	
depoliticisation	of	 imperialism	would	target	as,	 in	both	cases,	a	 link	 is	being	made	between	the	
policy	of	state	A	and	the	consequences	in	state	B.	In	order	to	be	successful,	a	depoliticizing	move	
would	have	to	convince	the	state	managers	and	public	of	state	B	that	the	policy	of	 imperialism	
undertaken	by	state	A,	and	the	relationship	between	the	two	states,	is	not	a	question	for	political	
contestation.	
As	with	any	state	policy,	imperialism	is	contradictory.	Imperialism	cannot	be	sustained	in	
perpetuity;	it	too	must	be	managed	because	of	its	consequences.	It	is	in	this	contradictory	nature,	
pervading	 all	 state	 policy,	 from	which	depoliticisation	derives.	 The	next	 section	will	 provide	 an	
overview	of	depoliticisation	as	a	policy	itself,	covering	the	key	debates	and	issues	in	the	subject,	
and	develops	further	its	significance	to	imperialism.	
	
Depoliticisation	and	Imperialism	
Depoliticisation,	as	the	near	obligatory	quotation	goes,	‘as	a	governing	strategy	is	the	process	of	
placing	at	one	remove	the	political	character	of	decision-making’	(Burnham	2001,	128).	It	 is,	put	
simply,	 a	 means	 by	 which	 state	 managers	 can	 pursue	 policies	 of	 accumulation	 while	
simultaneously	 insulating	themselves	from	the	delegitimation	that	 inherently	follows	from	such	
policies.	 This	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 way	 for	 state	 managers	 to	 court	 credibility,	 and	
competence,	 but	 still	 protect	 themselves	 from	 having	 made	 unpopular	 decisions.	 The	
unexpected,	 and	 apparently	 paradoxical,	 consequence	of	 this	move	 is	 that	 it	 actually	 increases	
the	political	control	of	state	managers,	and	their	autonomy	to	act.	Burnham	(2014,	195)	further	
clarifies	his	seminal	definition	by,	 first,	pointing	out	 that	 that	 it	 is	only	 the	political	character	of	
decision-making	 that	 is	 placed	 at	 one	 remove;	 politics	 can	 never	 truly	 be	 absent	 from	 the	
management	of	the	state,	or	any	aspect	of	society.	Secondly,	depoliticisation	actually	enhances	
political	control	and	autonomy,	whilst	giving	the	appearance	of	the	transfer	of	that	control	to	an	
apparently	 ‘external’	 entity.	 Finally,	 the	 success	 of	 a	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation	 depends	 on	
achieving	the	appearance	of	transferring	that	control.	
	 As	both	Burnham	(2014)	and	Wood	and	Flinders	(2014)	note,	the	study	of	depoliticisation	
has	 grown	 considerably	 in	 recent	 years;	 however,	 its	 usage	 has	 been	 analytically	 limited.	
Examples	of	depoliticisation	have	been	noted	 throughout	 the	20th	 century	and	 the	process	has	
found	itself	categorised	by	a	number	of	scholars.	Flinders	and	Buller	(2006)	offer	a	helpful	means	
of	categorizing	different	iterations	of	depoliticisation.	Their	account	offers	three	distinct	forms	of	
the	strategy:	institutional,	rule-,	and	discourse-based	depoliticisation.	Wood	and	Flinders	(2014),	
alternatively,	 offer	 three	 different	 forms	 of	 depoliticisation:	 governmental,	 societal	 and	
discursive.	Burnham	(2014,	190),	on	the	other	hand,	offers	three	separate	ways	in	which	a	critical	
Marxist	account	of	depoliticisation	can	be	developed:	as	 ‘arm’s-length	management’,	 ‘an	entire	
regime	of	governing’,	and	 ‘an	account	of	 the	methods	chosen	by	state	managers	to	externalize	
the	imposition	of	discipline/austerity	on	social	relations’.vii	
	 Traditionally,	 the	 role	 that	 the	 international	 realm	 has	 played	 in	 the	 scholarship	 on	
depoliticisation	 has	 focused	 on	 how	 changes	 in	 the	 international	 order	 have	 provided	 state	
managers	 the	 tools	 to	 depoliticize	 economic	 policy.	 Hay	 &	 Watson	 (1999)	 offer	 an	 excellent	
account	 of	 how	 ‘globalisation’	 was	 presented	 as	 a	 non-negotiable	 aspect	 of	 the	 international	
economy	by	New	Labour	in	the	late-1990s,	providing	them	simultaneously	with	market	credibility	
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while	also	shielding	them	from	any	fallout	from	unpopular	policies.	Burnham	(2001),	too,	points	
out	 the	 importance	 of	 understanding	 the	 international	 basis	 behind	 the	 operational	
independence	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England.	 Rogers	 (2009a,	 2009b)	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 IMF	
conditionality	under	the	Callaghan	government.	While	the	Callaghan	government	was	presented	
as	going	 ‘cap	 in	hand’	 to	 the	 IMF	to	seek	a	bridging	 loan	–	a	 loan	 that	 the	 IMF	was	unsure	was	
necessary.	This	allowed	the	government	to	introduce	strict	economic	policies	that	were	bound	to	
be	unpopular.	Kettell	(2008;	2004a;	2004b),	meanwhile,	provides	us	with	three	historical	episodes	
of	 depoliticisation:	 the	 European	 Exchange	 Rate	 Mechanism,	 the	 Gold	 Standard,	 and	 New	
Labour’s	desire	 for	 the	Euro.	All	 three	 reveal	 the	 reasons	and	value	of	 seeking	an	 international	
institution	to	manage	monetary	and	economic	policy,	and	thus	to	depoliticize	it.		
The	 open	 Marxist	 approach	 to	 depoliticisation	 stresses	 the	 fantastical	 nature	 of	 the	
international	realm	and	highlight	that	capitalism	is,	by	its	nature,	a	global	social	form.	This	means	
that	a	strategy	of	depoliticisation	follows	the	fantastical	form	of	capitalist	social	relations:	while	
nothing	can	ever	be	truly	depoliticized,	it	can	be	successful	in	so	far	as	it	is	able	to	exploit	the	basic	
ideological	 structures	 of	 capitalist	 society.	 In	 our	 society,	 politics	 and	 economics	 are	 seen	 as	
separable,	if	not	always	separate,	spheres	of	social	life.	Similarly,	the	national	state-form	is	seen	
as	the	essence	of	daily	political	life,	transforming	international	politics	into	a	completely	separate	
realm	 of	 political	 life	 that	 is	 outside	 the	 normal	 channels	 of	 political	 contestation.	 This	 is	 the	
ideological	 conceit	 that	allows	 strategies	of	depoliticisation	 in	 these	 instances	 to	 succeed:	 they	
are	seen	as	‘external’	institutions	that	constrain	and	limit	possibility	in	domestic	politics.	
	 These	examples	of	depoliticisation,	however,	all	 focus	on	a	domestic,	national	audience.	
The	 state	 managers	 in	 these	 examples,	 understanding	 the	 depoliticizing	 nature	 of	 the	
international	realm	and	its	institutions,	have	sought	to	manipulate	them	for	their	own	ends.	With	
the	exception	of	the	Hay	&	Watson	(1999)	piece,	which	covers	a	discourse-based	depoliticisation,	
the	 above	 examples	 offer	 studies	 of	 institution-based	 depoliticisation.	 Rules-based	
depoliticisation	 can	 be	 found	 quite	 readily	 in	 the	 1990s,	 with	 both	 the	 Major	 and	 Blair	
governments	 use	 of	 inflation	 targets,	 Gordon	 Brown’s	 so-called	 ‘Golden’	 and	 sustainable	
investment	rules,	as	well	as	the	‘Five	Economic	Tests’	for	British	adoption	of	the	Euro.	
	 Kettell	 (2008,	 635),	 in	 assessing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation,	
identifies	 two	 key	 areas	 for	 study:	 the	material	 effects	 and	 the	 impact	 on	 perceptions	 of	 that	
strategy.	Material	effects	are	the	actual	goals	and	objectives	of	the	policy.	For	example,	cutting	of	
government	spending,	control	of	inflation,	reducing	earnings	growth,	etc.	The	second,	the	impact	
on	perceptions,	 is	much	more	problematic	 to	study.	This	concerns	the	capacity	of	a	strategy	of	
depoliticisation	to	redirect	accountability,	or	public	attention,	away	from	state	managers.	
	 However,	Kettell	(2008,	637)	makes	an	important	point	that	‘analysing	the	actual	effects	of	
a	 depoliticisation	 policy	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	 through	 a	 process	 of	 considered	 debate	 and	
reasoned	discussion	of	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 the	policy	
itself’.	 The	 theoretical	 foundations	 for	 an	 account	 of	 the	 depoliticisation	 of	 imperialism	 can	
already	 be	 found	 in	 the	 extant	 scholarship	 on	 depoliticisation.	 By	 the	 very	 fact	 that	 state	
managers	can	appeal	to	‘the	international’	either	as	international	institutions	or	phenomena,	this	
fantastical	 realm	 has	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 depoliticize	 even	 the	 most	 nefarious	 of	 state-led	
schemes.	However,	 the	tools	available	 to	 those	authors	who	have	traced	domestic	 instances	of	
depoliticisation	are	not	as	readily	available	to	those	studying	its	international	iterations.		
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As	noted	earlier,	class	relations	are	the	starting	point	of	a	Marxist	approach:	the	study	of	
class	 analytically	 precedes	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 forms	 that	 society	 takes	 but	 has	 no	
existence	independent	of	those	forms	(Clarke	1972,	42;	Bonefeld	et	al	1996,	11).	The	state,	to	the	
open	Marxist	view,	is	a	concentration	of	the	political	character	of	society,	thus	rendering	the	rest	
of	society	outside	of	political	contestation.	As	such,	people	live	what	Marx	([1843]	2010,	13)	called	
a	 ‘twofold	 life’	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society:	 a	 political	 realm,	 and	 an	 apolitical	 realm	 of	
economic,	 or	 civil,	 intercourse.	 Apparently	 separated,	 the	 state	 and	 society	 appear	 as	
autonomous	entities	whilst	actually	being	essentially	united	as	capitalist	society.		
It	 is	 in	 fact	 that	 capitalism	 appears	 different	 to	 reality	 that	 enables	 a	 strategy	 of	
depoliticisation	 to	 function.	 However,	 the	 state	 is	 regularly	 forced	 to	 intervene	 visibly	 in	 the	
running	of	society	to	manage	class	relations.	As	Burnham	(2014,	197)	notes,		
‘Although	 a	 central	 aim	 of	 depoliticisation	 strategies	 is	 to	 convince	 key	 actors	 that	
state	managers	 are,	 to	 an	 extent,	 disengaged	 from	policy	making	 and	 delivery,	 the	
reorganisation	 of	 class	 relations	 periodically	 calls	 for	 the	 substantive	 and	 public	
intervention	of	the	state’	
A	 strategy	of	 imperialism	 is	 such	a	direct	 intervention	of	one	 state	 into	 the	 running	of	 another	
state.	While	both	are	reified	and	fetishized	forms	of	capitalist	society,	both	states	exist,	at	 least	
fantastically,	 as	 essentially	 political	 entities	 and	 so	 their	 actions	 are	 perceived	 as	 politically	
contestable.		
Since	 the	 justification	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 states	 is	 as	 apparently	 autonomous	 entities	
from	 the	 global	 economy	 and	 each	 other,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 strategy	 of	 imperialism	 imperils	 this	
justification,	 thus	 undermining	 the	 political	 justification	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 state.	 As	
Bonefeld	 (2014,	 203)	 notes,	 ‘every	 state	 is	 an	 entrepreneur	 of	memory	 to	 legitimize	 itself	 and	
justify	 its	 policies	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 nation	 and	 the	 national	 interest.’	 However,	 through	 the	
imperialist	actions	of	one	state,	 the	particular	national	character	of	another	state,	 justified	with	
various	 patriotic	 and	 nationalist	 ideologies,	 is	 also	 undermined,	 thereby	 not	 only	 causing	
problems	for	state	managers	of	the	dominated	state,	but	also	 its	people,	whose	exploitation	by	
capital	 is	 obfuscated	 by	 nationalist	 ideologies	 and	 manifest	 as	 an	 anti-imperial	 and	 anti-
government	 sentiment.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 the	 process	 through	 which	 imperialism,	 the	 direct	
intervention	 of	 one	 state	 into	 the	 workings	 of	 another,	 politicizes	 economic	 conditions	 and	
policymaking.	
The	 intervention	of	one	state	 into	the	territory	of	another,	by	an	act	of	 imperialism,	 is	a	
deeply	 and,	 importantly,	 overtly	 political	 act.	 Not	 only	 does	 it	 undermine	 the	 governing	
autonomy	of	state	managers	in	state	B,	subordinating	the	particular	and	historically-conditioned	
political	circumstances	to	those	in	state	A,	but	it	also	undermines	the	very	ideological	basis	upon	
which	states	depend:	political	autonomy,	sovereignty	and	national	self-determination.	As	such,	a	
strategy	 of	 imperialism	 can	 cause	 significant	 unrest	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 state	 that	 has	 been	
subordinated,	 as	 well	 as	 leaving	 state	 managers	 in	 the	 subordinated	 state	 vulnerable	 to	 this	
unrest.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 see,	 then,	 how	 depoliticisation	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 addition	 to	 a	 strategy	 of	
imperialism.	
Therefore,	 the	 use	 of	 depoliticisation	 may	 be	 helpful	 in	 transforming	 a	 strategy	 of	
imperialism	 into	an	apparently	necessary	or	 incontestable	event.	The	 institution	of	 the	Sterling	
Area,	as	well	as	the	discourse	surrounding	exchange	control	laws	in	the	Area,	are	therefore	good	
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examples	 of	 such	 an	 attempt	 to	 externalise	 the	 imposition	 of	 British	 international	 economic	
policy	on	other	states	in	the	Area.	It	is	in	this	next	section	that	the	Sterling	Area	and	its	origins	will	
be	traced	through	historical	analysis.	
	
The	Sterling	Area	
The	idea	that	the	international	realm	can	depoliticize	government	policy	is	clear	from	the	existing	
scholarship	on	depoliticisation.	The	very	fact	that	the	Gold	Standard,	the	IMF,	the	ERM,	etc.	are	
all	capable	of	placing	at	one	remove	the	political	character	of	decision-making	means	that	these	
entities	are	all	capable	of	doing	so	by	virtue	of	their	apparently	extra-national	existence.	Indeed,	
as	 Burnham	 (2001,	 134)	 notes,	 ‘the	 stronger	 (and	 more	 distant)	 the	 set	 of	 ‘rules’,	 the	 greater	
maneuverability	the	state	will	achieve,	increasing	the	likelihood	of	attaining	objectives.’	Burnham	
(ibid.,	 131)	 also	 identifies	 the	 shift	 from	 nebulous	 international	 cooperation	 to	 a	 more	 fixed	
regional	integration	in	the	early	1990s	key	characteristics	of	depoliticized	management.	
	 As	both	Kettell	 (2004;	 2008)	 and	Rogers	 (2009a;	 2009b)	 show,	 international	 institutions	
were	 able	 to	 depoliticize	 economic	 policy	 far	 before	 the	 1990s.	 However,	 while	 these	 authors	
account	for	the	depoliticizing	effect	these	institutions	provided	for	domestic	economic	policy,	this	
paper	 contends	 that	 these	 institutions	 can	 also	 depoliticize	 international	 economic	 policy.	 This	
section	 of	 the	 paper	 will	 look	 at	 the	 depoliticizing	 capacity	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 which	 is	
challenged	during	a	debacle	over	exchange	control	 laws	 in	Singapore	 in	 late	1955.	The	Sterling	
Area,	 this	 section	will	 argue,	was	 able	 to	 distance	 the	 political	 character	 of	 British	 imperialism	
while	also	enhancing	market	credibility.	
	 The	 official	 history	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 as	 recorded	 in	 an	 unpublished	 Foreign	 Office	
paper	written	by	Allen	Christelow,	under-secretary	to	the	Treasury	at	the	time,	declares	that	 its	
existence	was	concomitant	with	the	extension	of	British	sovereignty	throughout	the	19th	century	
(TNA	FO371/82915,	The	Sterling	Area,	24th	 January	1950).	 It	was	a	 region	within	which	Sterling	
was	 used	 as	 a	 means	 of	 exchange,	 and	 within	 which	 UK	 banks	 operated.	 This	 official	 history	
maintained	 that	 the	Sterling	Area	grew	naturally	 as	 a	 result	 of	Britain’s	 political	 and	 economic	
expansion,	 and	 subsequent	 laws	pertaining	 to	 the	Sterling	Area	were	merely	official	 stamps	of	
existence,	rather	than	the	genuine	inception	of	the	Area.	(ibid.)		
There	is	an	element	of	truth	to	this	perspective,	as	Britain	expanded	other	countries	were	
incorporated	into	Britain’s	political	and	economic	influence.	However,	the	actual	development	of	
the	Sterling	Area	occurred	in	the	1930s	and	1940s,	owing	to	a	series	of	laws	passed	by	the	British	
state.	With	the	abandonment	of	the	Gold	Standard	in	1931,	Britain	adopted	a	managed	exchange	
rate.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Exchange	 Equalisation	 Account	 (EEA).	 The	 EEA	 was	 the	
means	by	which	the	British	state	was	able	to	manage	the	rate	of	Sterling,	which	was	still	 freely	
convertible	and	there	were	no	exchange	controls.		
In	1932,	the	British	government	passed	the	 Import	Duties	Act,	which	 imposed	a	flat	rate	
tariff	on	all	imports	to	the	UK,	except	on	raw	materials	and	foodstuffs	(McKay	1932).	This	resulted	
in	 a	 trading	 area	 approximating	 the	 British	 Empire	 and	 Dominions,	 which	 would	 have	 low,	
reciprocal	tariffs	for	internal	trade	and	high	tariffs	for	any	external	trade	outside	of	the	area,	the	
purpose	 of	 which	 was	 to	 ensure	 access	 to	 markets	 for	 British	 produce	 and	 to	 stimulate	
Commonwealth	trade	(Eichengreen	&	Irwin	1995,	2-7).		
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The	Defence	(Finance)	Regulations	in	August	1939	saw	the	legal	emergence	of	the	Sterling	
Area	 as	 a	 means	 of	 exchange	 control.	 These	 exchange	 controls	 were	 copied	 throughout	 the	
Sterling	Area	and	resulted	in	the	Treasury	maintaining	a	monopoly	of	all	gold	and	foreign	reserves	
within	 the	 Sterling	 Area.	 These	 controls	 prohibited	 payments	 to	 all	 non-residents	 without	
permission	 of	 the	 Treasury,	 and	 allowed	 the	 Treasury	 ‘to	 exercise	 control	 over	 all	 securities	
marketable	 abroad	 and	 to	 compel	 their	 registration	 with	 a	 view	 to	 compulsory	 requisition	 by	
HMG’.	This	was	the	creation	of	the	‘dollar	pool’	and	the	exact	nature	of	the	Sterling	Area	after	the	
Second	World	War	 until	 its	 demise	 in	 1972	 (TNA	FO371/82915,	 The	Sterling	Area,	 24th	 January	
1950).	
	 Exchange	controls	were	generally	designed	to	manage	how	Sterling	was	transferred	into	
US	dollars,	due	to	the	dollar’s	great	value	during	the	war.	Schenk	(1994,	8)	suggests	the	Sterling	
Area	after	 the	war	could	be	characterised	by	 three	 features:	 	 ‘members	pegged	 their	exchange	
rates	 to	 sterling,	 maintained	 a	 common	 exchange	 control	 against	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world	 while	
enjoying	 free	 current	 and	 capital	 transactions	 with	 the	 UK	 and,	 thirdly,	 maintained	 national	
reserves	 in	sterling	which	required	pooling	foreign	exchange	earnings.’	The	principal	purpose	of	
the	exchange	controls,	however,	should	be	seen	in	terms	of	the	post-war	dollar	shortage:	these	
controls	 were	 intended	 to	 restrict	 convertibility	 of	 Sterling	 into	 dollars.	 Due	 to	 the	 trade	
imbalance	between	the	US	and	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	without	these	controls,	British	gold	and	
currency	 reserves	would	 have	 swiftly	 dwindled.	 Britain	 and	 the	 Sterling	Area	would	 have	 been	
unable	to	import	any	goods	from	the	US,	exacerbating	the	fundamental	problem:	the	inability	of	
British	goods	to	compete	with	US	exports.	Furthermore,	the	post-war	settlement	required	large-
scale	dollar	imports	to	for	the	reconstruction	and	restructuring	of	the	British	economy	(Burnham	
1990).	 As	 such,	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 was	 essential	 to	 Britain’s	 continued	 economic	 vitality	 and	
without	 it,	 harsh	 austerity	measures	 would	 have	 been	 necessary,	 bringing	 the	 entire	 post-war	
consensus	into	doubt.	
	 However,	 this	 system	 was	 prone	 to	 regular	 crisis.	 British	 reserves,	 in	 the	 EEA,	 though	
supported	by	the	whole	Sterling	Area,	were	not	sufficient	to	support	the	demand	for	dollar	goods.	
As	the	draft	announcement	of	Operation	ROBOT,	though	never	given,	suggests,	this	was	a	very	
delicate	system	and	needed	to	be	supported	in	order	to	sustain	Britain’s	economy	after	the	war.	
‘The	UK	is	the	banker	of	the	Sterling	Area.	We	hold	the	gold	and	dollar	reserves	upon	
which	the	whole	sterling	system	depends.	It	is	an	important	system,	for	it	finances	half	
the	total	trade	of	the	world.	Its	strength	and	continuity	are	necessary	not	only	for	us	
but	for	the	whole	world.	 If	 the	reserves	are	too	small	or	subject	to	too	great	strains,	
then	 the	 strength	 and	 continuity	 of	 the	 system	 are	 endangered.	 Yet	 our	 existing	
external	financial	system	in	fact	puts	the	maximum	strain	where	it	can	least	be	borne	
and	where	it	can	cause	the	greatest	damage...	Our	reserves	are	not	capable	of	taking	
the	same	strain	as	before	the	war.’	(BE	G1/123,	Draft	of	ROBOT	announcement,	25th	
June	1952)		
Indeed,	 the	 system	was	 so	 delicate	 and	 needed	 so	much	 support	 that	 plans	 like	 ROBOT	were	
seriously	considered.viii	The	Sterling	Area,	then,	can	be	understood	as	a	means	through	which	the	
British	 state	 was	 able	 to	 support	 its	 reserve	 position	 through	 the	 pooling	 of	 foreign	 currency,	
particularly	US	dollars,	and	gold.	These	reserves	were	used	to	support	the	value	of	Sterling	and	
the	 imports	 that	 were	 necessary	 to	 enable	 Britain’s	 postwar	 reconstruction	 (Burnham	 1990).	
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Exchange	control	 law	 in	 the	UK	and	 the	Sterling	Area	was	 crucial	 to	 the	operation	of	 the	Area	
even	by	the	mid-1950s	since	it	provided	‘the	powers	which	are	necessary	to	restrict	currency	and	
financial	transactions	so	long	as	the	sterling	area	cannot	maintain	a	balance	of	payments	with	the	
rest	of	the	world	without	such	restrictions.	The	need	to	maintain	the	restrictions	continues’	(TNA	
FCO141/7437,	 Treasury	 Memorandum	 from	 the	 Financial	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Federation,	 25	
November	1955).	
The	Sterling	Area’s	existence	after	1939,	then,	took	the	form	of	a	formalized	currency	and	
trading	zone,	which	relied	principally	on	the	existence	of	the	exchange	control	laws	in	its	member	
states.	While	the	Sterling	Area	was	never	conceived	of,	nor	managed,	as	a	permanent	aspect	of	
British	 policy,	 these	 laws	 prevented	 the	 convertibility	 of	 Sterling	 without	 the	 approval	 of	 the	
British	 state,	 as	 well	 as	 required	 the	 pooling	 of	 foreign	 currency	 earned	 by	 the	 sale	 of	
commodities	and	services	from	member	states,	by	the	Bank	of	England	in	the	EEA	(Schenk	1994,	
130).	Once	pooled	 in	 the	EEA,	 this	 foreign	 currency	pool	 became,	 for	 all	 intents	 and	purposes,	
Britain’s	 foreign	 currency	 reserves.	As	 such,	 it	 is	 generally	well	 accepted	 that	 the	Sterling	Area	
was	not	just	a	mechanism	for	imperial	economic	policy	but	that	it	was	an	international	institution	
(Schenk	 1994,	 135).	 Indeed,	much	of	 the	 literature	on	British	 imperial	 economic	policy	 and	 the	
Sterling	Area	 treats	 the	empire	and	 the	Area	as	a	monolithic	 institution	 (Bell	 1958;	Hinds	1987,	
1999,	2001;	Krozewski	1993,	2001;	Schenk	1994,	1996);	however,	this	remains	a	problematic	view	
in	that	it	fetishes	British	imperialism,	making	it	‘thing-like’	–	an	‘empire’	–	and	thus	side-lines	the	
need	 for	 critical	 analysis	 of	 relations	 between	 specific	 states	 (Sutton	 2015,	 9-15).	 In	 effect,	 in	
treating	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 or	 the	 British	 Empire,	 as	 things	 themselves	 obfuscates	 the	 social	
relations	 that	 created	 them,	 and	 is	 manifested	 through	 them.	 Moreover,	 as	 has	 been	 noted	
elsewhere	 (Krozewski	 1997,	 850;	 Darwin	 2002;	 Sutton	 2015,	 15),	 this	 kind	 of	 analysis	 has	 the	
unfortunate	consequence	of	accepting	a	dichotomy	between	politics	and	economics.	
Considering	 the	 specific	 imperial	 relationships	 between	 Britain	 and	 other	 states	 reveals	
considerable	variation.	Malaya	was	one	of	the	principal	dollar	earners	for	the	Sterling	Area’s	dollar	
pool,	 and	 hence	 one	 of	 the	 main	 supports	 for	 Britain’s	 post-war	 economy.	 Malaya	 was	 the	
Sterling	Area’s	largest	dollar	earner	through	its	sale	of	natural	rubber	and	tin	to	the	US,	with	a	net	
surplus	 of	 US$120m	 in	 1954:	 greater	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 colonies’	 earnings	 combined	 (TNA	
CO1030/100,	Exchange	Control	Problems	 in	Malaya,	16	September	1955).	Coupled	with	the	fact	
that	Britain	itself	was	a	net	dollar	spender	of	US$250m	in	1954,	Malaya	still	remained	extremely	
important	to	the	maintenance	of	the	Sterling	Area,	which	was	still	vital	to	British	economic	and	
monetary	strategy	(ibid.).	It	was	this	capacity	to	contribute	to	the	Sterling	Area’s	dollar	pool	that	
was	challenged	in	an	incident	in	1955.	The	next	section	will	focus	on	this	incident.	
	
Marshall’s	Law	
The	exchange	controls	of	the	Sterling	Area	became	the	centre	of	a	political	dispute	in	Singapore	
at	the	end	of	1955.	The	newly	elected	Chief	Minister	of	Singapore,	Saul	Marshall,	decided	to	use	
the	 collective	 dollar	 earnings	 of	 Malaya	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 in	 any	 future	 constitutional	
settlement	by	deliberately	politicising	Singapore’s	exchange	control	laws.	Given	the	nature	of	the	
constitutional	 arrangement	between	 the	governments	of	Singapore	and	Malaya,	whatever	one	
government	chose	to	do	had	enormous	repercussions	on	the	other.	As	a	 result	of	 this,	 too,	 the	
Bank	of	England	considered	both	their	economies	and	external	trade	as	only	fully	comprehensible	
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as	 a	 single	 whole	 (BE	 OV65/5,	 Federation	 of	 Malaya:	 Sterling	 Assets,	 Trade	 and	 Balance	 of	
Payments,	24	January	1957).	
At	 the	 upcoming	 Constitutional	 Talks	 in	 1956,	 he	 intended	 to	 press	 Britain	 for	 early	
independence	 for	 Singapore	 in	 1957	 (TNA	 CO1030/100,	 Telegram	 no.143,	 9	 November	 1955).	
However,	Marshall	 expected	 this	 to	 be	 dismissed	 out	 of	 hand	 and	 that	was	why	 he	wished	 to	
make	an	issue	of	the	exchange	control	ordinance.		
‘The	only	weapon	to	hand	was	the	Malayan	dollar	surplus	and	so	he	proposed	to	use	
that	 by	 deliberately	 and	 openly	 threatening	 to	 deny	 its	 use	 to	 the	 Sterling	
Commonwealth	by	 the	abandonment	of	exchange	control	 if	he	did	not	get	what	he	
wanted	on	the	political	front.’	(TNA	CO1030/100,	Telegram	no.687,	7	November	1955)		
Marshall	 stated	 his	 intention	 to	 renew	 Singapore’s	 exchange	 control	 ordinance	 for	 six	
months	only,	which	was	half	 the	usual	 time	 (TNA	CO1030/100,	Exchange	Control,	 9	November	
1955).	 In	 fact,	Marshall	 explicitly	 stated	 to	 the	Governor	of	Singapore	 that	 ‘he	wanted	 to	put	a	
loaded	pistol	on	the	table	knowing	that	the	Secretary	of	State	and	sterling	Commonwealth	could	
never	 let	 him	 use	 it’	 (TNA	 FCO141/7437,	 Telegram	 from	 High	 Commissioner	 of	 Federation	 to	
Colonial	 Office,	 7	 November	 1955).	 Marshall’s	 demand	 then,	 as	 understood	 by	 the	 High	
Commissioner	of	the	Federation,	was	either	to	receive	early	self-government	or	force	the	British	
to	 renew	 exchange	 controls	 by	 fiat	 and	 to	 dismiss	 him,	 thereby	 strengthening	 his	 political	
position	in	Singapore	in	terms	of	his	‘fight	for	[Singapore’s]	freedom’	(ibid.).	The	Prime	Minister,	
Anthony	Eden,	declared	Marshall’s	move	as	‘blackmail’	(TNA	CO1030/100,	Philip	de	Zulueta	to	JB	
Johnston,	 10	November	 1955).	However,	 in	doing	 so,	 the	British	government	would	 visibly	 and	
directly	intervene	in	the	everyday	running	of	the	Sterling	Area,	thus	revealing	the	extent	to	which	
Singaporean	governing	autonomy	was	subordinated	to	the	British	state,	thereby	politicising	the	
role	of	the	Sterling	Area.	
Marshall	 had	 formed	only	a	minority	government	 in	Singapore	and	his	political	position	
was	weak.	One	means	of	establishing	his	credentials	as	a	true	leader	of	Singapore,	with	the	city’s	
interests	 at	 heart,	 was	 by	 seeking	 an	 economics	 adviser	 from	 the	 IMF	 to	 replace	 the	 Bank	 of	
England’s	appointee,	JB	Loynes.	Marshall	argued	that	Loynes	would	never	act	in	Malaya’s	interest	
unless	 it	 was	 also	 in	 Britain’s	 or,	 particularly,	 the	 Bank’s	 interests.	 It	 was	 widely	 believed	 in	
Malayan	political	circles	that,	while	the	Colonial	Office	had	Malaya’s	best	 interests	at	heart,	the	
Bank	 had	 sectional	 interests	 and	 was	 not	 committed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Malayan	
economy	(BE	OV65/4,	Malaya,	28th	April	1950).	Sir	Robert	Black,	Governor	of	Singapore,	felt	that,	
in	doing	so,	Marshall	was	continuing	to	present	himself	as	a	truly	Malayan	politician,	independent	
of	London	(TNA	CO1030/100,	Telegram	no.142,	8th	November	1955).		
The	 British	 state,	 in	 response	 to	Marshall’s	 position,	 tried	 to	 convince	 him	 of	 the	 good	
reasons	 to	 retain	 exchange	 controls,	 as	well	 as	 the	 value	 of	 the	 Sterling	Area.	MacGillivray,	 in	
conversation	with	Marshall,	 told	 him	 that	 this	 course	 of	 action	was	 very	 dangerous	 to	Malaya	
economically	and	even	a	 fully	 independent	Malaya	would	need	some	kind	of	exchange	control.	
He	further	emphasised	to	Marshall	that	the	British	would	call	his	bluff	and	serious	damage	could	
be	done	to	the	Malayan	economy	in	the	meantime.	Marshall	responded	by	saying	that	it	would	be	
impossible	for	the	UK	to	call	his	bluff	as	the	independent	Sterling	Area	would	intervene	and	force	
Britain	to	accept	the	terms.	However,	Marshall	acknowledged	to	MacGillivray	that	this	bargaining	
strategy	was	useless	without	the	support	of	the	Federation,	as	the	Federation	was	the	source	of	
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the	vast	majority	of	Malaya’s	dollar	earnings	(ibid.).	Both	Marshall	and	the	British	then	sought	the	
Federation’s	support.	
Marshall	 had	 already	 sought	 Abdul	 Rahman’s,	 the	 Chief	 Minister	 of	 the	 Federation,	
support	at	the	Joint	Ministers	Conference	and,	indeed,	there	was	support	in	the	Federation	due	to	
the	 widespread	 belief	 that	 Malaya	 would	 do	 well	 out	 of	 leaving	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 (TNA	
CO1030/100,	 Exchange	 Control	 Problems	 in	 Malaya,	 16	 September	 1955).	 However,	 his	 plan	
required	the	support	of	the	entire	Alliance	Party	in	the	Federation	and	this	was	not	forthcoming	
(TNA	CO1030/100,	Telegram	no.143,	9	November	1955).	
	 At	the	Joint	Federation-Singapore	Ministers	Conference,	Marshall	put	forward	a	series	of	
arguments	in	favour	of	his	proposal	for	using	Exchange	Control	Ordinance	as	a	bargaining	chip	in	
the	Constitutional	Talks	with	London:	
• Malaya	as	a	whole	lost	more	by	exchange	control	than	it	gained;		
• The	 Central	 Bank	 proposed	 by	 the	 IBRD	 mission	 would	 give	 Malaya	 further	 financial	
independence	 and,	 following	 formal	 independence,	 this	 might	 help	 in	 finding	 a	 future	
away	from	the	Sterling	Area;	
• The	ruling	parties	in	both	Singapore	and	the	Federation	were	committed	to	independence	
in	1957;	
• A	 six-month	 extension	would	 see	Ordinance	 expire	 in	 June	 1956,	 by	which	 time	Britain	
would	have	to	respond	to	demands	for	accelerated	self-government;	
• Taking	a	hard	 line	with	the	British	government	would	politically	strengthen	the	Malayan	
Chief	Ministers	and	governments;	
• Singapore	could	not	act	alone.	The	Federation’s	and	Singapore’s	interests	were	conjoined	
and	Abdul	Rahman’s	support	was	vital	(TNA	CO1030/100,	Exchange	Control,	9	November	
1955)	
These	arguments	were	completely	dismissed	by	Singapore’s	own	Minister	for	Economic	Affairs;	
however,	Marshall	was	 uninterested	 in	 the	 technical	 considerations	 of	 his	 arguments	 –	 he	was	
solely	 concerned	 with	 the	 political	 success	 of	 his	 gamble	 (ibid.).	 The	 Colonial	 Office	 was	 well	
aware	that	a	sense	of	injustice	surrounding	Malaya’s	net	dollar	contribution	to	the	Sterling	Area	
had	begun	to	politicise	the	Sterling	Area,	and	could	not	simply	be	dismissed	as	pure	propaganda	
or	ignorance.	This	idea	of	colonial	exploitation	had	become	deeply	embedded	in	the	beliefs	of	the	
commercial	and	industrial	sectors	in	Malaya	and	the	Colonial	Office	were	worried	that	the	issue	of	
Malaya’s	 membership	 in	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 would	 shift	 entirely	 from	 an	 economic	 issue	 into	 a	
political	one	 (TNA	CO1030/100,	 ‘Malaya	and	the	Sterling	Area’,	27	September	1955).	As	such,	 it	
could	become	a	widely	held	public	view	that	the	Area	was	synonymous	with	colonial	exploitation	
and	domination	by	a	foreign	power,	which	would	be	extraordinarily	difficult	to	respond	to,	other	
than	to	argue	the	economic	benefits	to	all	of	Malaya’s	continued	membership	of	the	Area	(ibid.).	
In	 other	 words,	 the	 British	 state	 continued	 to	 see	 the	 key	 basis	 for	 maintaining	 Malaya’s	
membership	of	 the	Sterling	Area	was	 to	persist	 in	 the	claim	that	 it	was	a	solely	economic	 issue,	
thus	to	remove	membership	from	the	realm	of	political	contestation.	
The	irony,	however,	was	that	Marshall	saw	these	technical	arguments	as	further	support	
for	his	own	position.	As	Sir	Robert	Black	reported	to	Lennox-Boyd,	
‘The	more	we	attempt	to	argue	on	financial	and	economic	grounds	that	it	is	essential	
for	 Malaya	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 the	 more	 convinced,	 of	 course,	 the	 Chief	
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Minister	may	 become	 that	 he	 has	 a	 powerful	 weapon	 and	 therefore	 he	will	 be	 the	
more	 determined	 to	 use	 it	 politically.’	 (TNA	 CO1030/100,	 Exchange	 Control,	 9	
November	1955)		
This	 meant	 that	 Marshall	 himself	 could	 not	 be	 persuaded	 to	 retreat	 from	 his	 position,	
leaving	only	limited	options	for	British	state	managers	to	deal	with	this	dilemma.	Sir	Robert	Black	
outlined	the	problem	with	the	available	options	in	correspondence	with	the	Colonial	Office:	
‘If	I	accept…	that	the	Ordinance	should	be	extended	for	6	months	only,	then	the	Chief	
Minister	has	his	political	weapon	for	next	April	and	business	is	unsettled	by	the	future	
uncertainty.	 If	 I…	 prolong	 the	 Ordinance	 for	 one	 year,	 then	 there	 is	 the	 strong	
possibility	 of	 a	 constitutional	 crisis.	 Such	 a	 crisis	 would	 also,	 of	 course,	 arise	 if	 the	
Ordinance	 were	 extended	 for	 6	 months	 now,	 and	 has	 to	 be	 extended	 without	 the	
Ministers’	 agreement	 after	 June	 next	 year.	Mr	Marshall	 could	 obviously	make	 great	
political	 play	 with	 the	 “British	 government’s	 greater	 regard	 for	 sterling	 than	 for	
Singapore’s	 self-government”,	 etc.	 etc.’	 (TNA	 FCO141/7437,	 From	 Governor	 of	
Singapore	to	Colonial	Secretary,	9	November	1955)	
In	Black’s	words,	 this	 comes	 across	 as	 a	 dilemma	of	 politicisation:	 either	 the	British	 state	does	
intervene	and	politicise	the	whole	system	of	exchange	controls,	and	thus	the	basis	of	the	Sterling	
Area	 itself,	 or	 do	 nothing	 and	 reduce	 the	 state’s	 market	 credibility	 quite	 substantially.	 Black	
further	elaborated	on	the	point	of	market	credibility	by	pointing	out	 that	 ‘absence	of	exchange	
control	 in	 the	 present	 climate	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 area	would	 put	 the	
local	 economy	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 local	 and	 external	 speculators	 in	 the	 Malayan	 currency.	 The	
Federation	would	almost	certainly	be	unable	in	such	circumstances	to	prevent	a	flight	of	capital’	
(ibid.).	Clearly	understood	and	articulated	here,	then,	by	British	state	managers	are	the	negative	
consequences	 associated	 with	 the	 failure	 to	 depoliticise	 the	 imperial	 character	 of	 the	 Sterling	
Area,	which	would	have	been	severe.	
Sir	 Hilton	 Poynton,	 Deputy	 Under-Secretary	 at	 the	 Colonial	 Office,	 underlined	 the	
importance	of	the	whole	situation,	to	Leslie	Rowan,	the	head	of	the	Overseas	Finance	division	at	
the	Treasury.	
‘I	 think	 you	 will	 agree	 that	 refusal	 by	 Singapore	 and	 the	 Federation	 to	 continue	
exchange	control	amounts	 in	effect	to	the	withdrawal	 (or	expulsion)	of	Malaya	from	
the	 Sterling	 Area.	 However	 alarming	 this	 may	 be	 to	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 [rest	 of	 the	
Sterling	 Area]	 I	 think	 it	 would	 be	 tactically	 unwise	 to	 let	 Marshall	 think	 we	 were	
alarmed	on	this	ground	since	it	would	enhance	the	value	of	this	manoeuvre	in	his	eyes	
as	 a	 form	 of	 political	 blackmail.	 Moreover	 if	 the	 price	 asked	 is	 early	 full	 self-
government	there	would	be	nothing	to	stop	Marshall	and	his	friends	doing	whatever	
they	want	when	they	have	got	full	self-government.’	(TNA	CO1030/100,	AH	Poynton	
to	Sir	Leslie	Rowan	(SECRET),	16	November	1955)	
It	was	considered	very	unlikely	by	the	Colonial	Office	that	he	would	agree	to	Singapore’s	
suggestion,	though	the	Colonial	Office	was	aware	of	the	possibility.	Sir	Robert	Black	advised	the	
Colonial	Office	that,	 if	worse	came	to	worst,	he	could	reject	the	six-month	extension,	or	force	a	
further	 extension	 after	 the	 six	months;	 however,	 he	warned	 that	 both	 courses	 of	 action	would	
lead	 to	 a	 constitutional	 crisis,	 thus	 politicising	 the	 Sterling	Area	 and	 exchange	 controls	 and	 be	
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used	by	Marshall	to	further	his	own	agenda	(TNA	CO1030/100,	 ‘Exchange	Control’,	9	November	
1955).	
	 The	only	available	option	was	to	stop	Marshall	gaining	any	support	from	the	Federation.	
This	could	only	rest	on	the	fact	that	Britain	would	consent	to	accepting	the	lapsing	of	exchange	
control	ordinance,	and	that	the	consequences	to	Malaya’s	economy	would	be	catastrophic.	The	
advice	 sought	 by	 the	 Colonial	Office	 from	 the	 Bank	was	 clarification	 as	 to	whether	 the	 British	
government	 could	 afford	 to	 call	 Marshall’s	 bluff,	 or	 if	 Britain	 was	 required	 to	 stop	 it	 as	 the	
dominant	state	of	the	Sterling	Area.	The	Colonial	Office	also	asked	for	a	document	detailing	the	
merits	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 the	 demerits	 of	 leaving	 to	 join	 another	 currency	 bloc	 (TNA	
CO1030/100,	AH	Poynton	to	Sir	Leslie	Rowan	(SECRET),	16	November	1955).	
‘What	seems	to	us	to	be	needed	is	a	paper	written	in	simple	language	for	the	layman,	
divided	perhaps	 into	 two	parts:	 the	 first	would	 set	out	 the	 very	meagre	advantages	
which	would	accrue	to	Malaya	if	she	were	to	ally	herself	with	the	US	dollar;	the	second	
would	 show	 the	 immediate	 and	 formidable	 disadvantage	 which	 would	 follow	 on	
severance	from	the	sterling	area.	This	could…	be	pitched	fairly	strong	and	include	the	
blocking	of	the	£300m	Malayan	Sterling	Balances.’	(ibid.)	
Marshall	was	aware	that	he	could	not	use	exchange	control	as	a	bargaining	chip	unless	his	
ministers	 supported	 it,	 and,	 crucially,	 the	 Federation	 government	 supported	 it.	 Poynton	 then	
suggested	to	Rowan	that	MacGillivray	and	Black	should	be	pressed	to	convince	the	ministers	 in	
both	governments	to	reject	Marshall’s	proposal	(ibid.).	However,	if	they	were	unable	to	persuade	
Marshall	to	give	up	his	idea	before	he	left	Singapore	for	London,	then	it	would	be	made	an	issue	
in	London	at	the	Constitutional	Talks.	The	line	agreed	between	Poynton	and	Rowan	was	that	the	
Colonial	Secretary	would	discuss	it	but	only	as	an	economic	matter.	
Given	 the	 determination	 of	 Lennox-Boyd	 to	 only	 discuss	 the	 situation	 as	 an	 economic	
matter,	 and	 to	maintain	 there	would	 be	 no	 alternative	 but	 for	 Singapore	 to	 leave	 the	 Sterling	
Area,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	 desire	 by	 British	 state	managers	 to	 prevent	 this	matter	 becoming	 a	
contestable	political	issue.	Again,	the	politicisation	of	exchange	controls	was	something	that	Alan	
Lennox-Boyd,	 the	 Colonial	 Secretary,	 was	 explicitly	 eager	 to	 avoid.	 In	 a	 telegram	 to	 the	 High	
Commissioner	of	 the	Federation,	Sir	Donald	MacGillivray,	 and	 to	Sir	Robert	Black,	he	explicitly	
states	that.	
‘It	is	clear	that	such	measures	would	have	the	regrettable	effect	of	bringing	exchange	
control	into	the	arena	of	political	dispute	under	circumstances	which	would	be	wholly	
inimical	 to	 a	 cool	 and	 dispassionate	 examination	 of	 such	 technical	 aspects	 of	 the	
system	 as	 might	 require	 modification.’	 (TNA	 FCO141/7437,	 Exchange	 Control,	 23	
November	1955)	
Not	only	is	Lennox-Boyd’s	language	quite	indicative	of	what	Burnham	(2001,	144)	refers	to	as	the	
‘guise	of	technical	efficiency’	but	is	also	redolent	of	Norman	Lamont’s	concern	that	the	failure	of	
the	ERM	would	lead	to	decision-making	being	‘seen	as	entirely	political’	(Lamont	1996,	275,	cited	
in	 Kettell	 2008,	 644).	 Indeed,	 this	moment	 reveals	 the	 core	 goal	 of	 British	 state	managers:	 by	
treating	exchange	control	as	a	purely	technical	issue,	the	unequal	basis	of	the	relationships	in	the	
Sterling	Area	remains	uncontested.	However,	due	to	their	 inherently	political	nature,	they	were	
not	certain	to	remain	so	forever.	As	Burnham	(2014,	202)	notes	‘it	would	be	naive	to	assert	that	by	
depoliticising	economic	policy	state	managers	can	avoid	the	emergence	of	political	unrest’.	In	this	
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case,	Marshall’s	desire	for	political	aggrandizement	and	increasing	governing	autonomy	directly	
led	to	a	struggle	over	the	politicization	of	exchange	controls	in	Singapore;	the	outcome	of	which	
was	far	from	predetermined.	
Lennox-Boyd	 remained	 hopeful	 that	 MacGillivray	 would	 see	 success	 in	 his	 efforts	 to	
persuade	 ministers	 not	 to	 pursue	 threats	 to	 abandon	 exchange	 controls	 in	 Singapore,	 or	 the	
Federation.	 Lennox-Boyd	 telegrammed	 MacGillivray	 that	 he	 should	 remind	 ministers	 in	
Singapore	and	the	Federation	that	economic	setbacks	would	mean	political	setbacks,	referring	to	
independence.	He	also	emphasised	that	the	exchange	controls	of	the	Federation	and	Singapore	
were	‘of	vital	significance	to	the	economic	life	of	the	Area’	(TNA	CO1030/100,	Telegram	no.164,	
23	 November	 1955).	 However,	 he	 also	 asked	 MacGillivray	 to	 emphasise	 that	 linking	 the	 two	
subjects	 for	 political	 or	 constitutional	 progress	 could	 lead	 to	 catastrophe	 economically	 and	
politically	 (ibid.).	 Indeed,	 Lennox-Boyd	 told	 MacGillivray	 that	 even	 the	 minimum	measures	 to	
protect	Britain	and	 the	Sterling	Area	 from	a	potential	Malayan	 free-exchange	area	would	have	
enormous	consequences	for	Malaya.	Outlining	these	measures,	he	told	MacGillivray	that	controls	
would	have	to	be	set	up	between	the	Sterling	Area	and	Malaya,	as	well	as	a	restriction	on	Malayan	
development	capital,	and	the	severe	hindrance	of	the	traditional	banking	relationship	enjoyed	by	
Area	members	(ibid.;	BE	OV65/4,	Sterling	Area:	Abandonment	of	Exchange	Control	in	Singapore	
(SECRET),	 29	 November	 1955).	 In	 essence,	 it	 would	 have	 consequences	 that	 were	 almost	
synonymous	with	Malaya’s	withdrawal	 from	the	Sterling	Area;	however,	British	state	managers	
were	adamant	that	this	outcome	would	not	occur.	
Above	 all,	 Lennox-Boyd	 was	 hopeful	 that	 Federation	 Ministers	 were	 deterred	 from	
Marshall’s	 proposed	 course	 of	 action	 by	 the	 economic	 arguments	made,	 and	 that	 they	 would	
therefore	 not	 support	 Marshall’s	 proposal.	 MacGillivray	 wrote	 back	 to	 Lennox-Boyd	 two	 days	
later	to	tell	him	that	he	had	met	with	Abdul	Rahman.	Rahman	had	told	him	that	the	Federation	
was	extremely	unlikely	to	support	Marshall’s	proposal,	though	Marshall	was	coming	to	see	him	on	
the	 26th	November	 to	 discuss	 the	 issue	with	 Rahman	 (TNA	CO1030/100,	 Exchange	Control,	 25	
November	1955).	
	 MacGillivray	 also	 relayed	 that	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Singapore	 Executive	 Council	 had	
informed	 him	 they	 intended	 to	 renew	 exchange	 controls	 for	 another	 year	 due	 to	 the	
overwhelming	 economic	 argument	 (ibid.).	 Four	 days	 later,	 exchange	 control	 ordinances	 were	
renewed	by	one	year,	rather	than	six	months.	Black	told	Lennox-Boyd	that	Marshall	justified	his	
climb-down	by	saying	that	‘his	bargaining	position	[was]	sufficiently	strong	not	to	have	to	make	
use	of	the	exchange	control	weapon.	In	the	circumstances	he	had	no	option	but	to	abandon	the	
idea’	 (TNA	CO1030/100,	Telegram	no.156,	 29	November	 1955;	 FCO141/7437,	 From	Governor	of	
Singapore	to	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Colonies,	29	November	1955).	
	 Despite	 the	 eventual	 climb-down	 from	 Marshall’s	 initial	 position,	 Britain’s	 strategic	
interests,	the	role	of	the	Sterling	Area,	and	the	fear	of	British	state	managers	that	it	be	politicised	
are	 all	 highlighted	 by	 this	 episode.	 Marshall’s	 goal	 was	 to	 ‘weaponise’	 Singapore’s	 exchange	
controls	 as	 a	 political	 tool	 for	 the	 constitutional	 talks	 for	 Singapore’s	 eventual	 independence.	
However,	had	this	been	successful,	 it	would	have	brought	the	exchange	controls	into	a	realm	of	
political	dispute,	politicising	not	only	their	 role	 in	 the	Sterling	Area	and	the	Area	 itself,	but	also	
creating	an	atmosphere	of	economic	uncertainty	and	undermining	market	credibility.	
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	 Ultimately,	Marshall’s	gamble	 failed	due	to	his	 reliance	on	the	Federation	to	support	his	
position.	British	state	managers,	knowing	this	weakness	 in	his	position,	 realised	 it	was	 the	only	
reasonable	option	to	undermine	him.	However,	by	this	time,	British	state	managers	had	revealed	
how	concerned	they	were	that	Malaya’s	dollar	earnings	might	be	might	be	brought	into	question,	
generating	 a	 number	of	 arguments	 for	Malaya	 to	 remain	 committed	 to	 the	Area.	This	 episode	
also	reveals	that	British	state	managers	relied	on	the	technical	nature	of	the	Area’s	structure	to	
depoliticise	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 which	 was,	 in	 effect,	 a	 long-term	 aspect	 of	 imperial	 economic	
policy.	
While	Wood	and	Flinders	(2014,	153)	are	critical	of	a	‘narrow	state-centric’	approach,	their	
own	perspective,	 following	Hay	 (2007)	 and	 Flinders	 (2008),	makes	 a	 good	point	 in	 highlighting	
that	repoliticisation	is	an	ever-present	danger	in	any	depoliticisation.	However,	this	is	also	a	point	
made	by	more	‘state-centric’	approaches,	such	as	by	Burnham	(2001;	2007;	2014),	Kettell	(2008;	
2009)	and	Rogers	(2009a;	2009b).	
In	these	circumstances,	Marshall,	in	his	role	as	the	Chief	Minister	of	Singapore,	sought	to	
transform	 exchange	 control	 from	 a	 depoliticized	 aspect	 of	 economic	 policy	 to	 a	 much	 more	
discretionary	 tool.	 This	 was	 a	 political	 gamble	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 an	 even	 greater	 level	 of	
governing	 autonomy	 and	 to	 preserve	 his	 own	 political	 position.	 Indeed,	 after	 the	 London	
negotiations,	Marshall	was	forced	to	resign	his	position	as	Chief	Minister,	declaring	that	he	had	
failed	in	his	mission	to	achieve	independence	for	Singapore.	
	In	 this	 instance,	 however,	 that	 governing	 autonomy	 related	 not	 only	 to	 a	 domestic	
audience	but	also	 to	 the	British	 state.	Marshall	also	 sought	 to	bring	attention	 to	 the	 inherently	
unequal	nature	of	the	Sterling	Area’s	organization	and	purpose.	The	goal	of	this	politicization	was	
to	 leverage	 speedier	 independence	 for	 Singapore,	 as	well	 as	 to	 sure	 up	 his	 own	weak	 political	
position,	 but	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	would	 have	 been	 far	 broader,	 endangering	 the	 Sterling	
Area’s	apparent	apolitical	nature	in	general,	thus	bringing	the	whole	organization	of	British	post-
war	external	economic	policy	into	question.	
	
Conclusion	
The	study	of	the	various	strategies	of	depoliticisation	have	so	far	focused	on	domestic	politics	and	
how	 either	 international	 institutions	 or	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 globalization	 can	 be	 introduced	 to	
depoliticize	 economic	 policy-making	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 Absent,	 however,	 is	 how	 the	
depoliticisation	of	international	economic	policy	can	be	used	to	limit	the	challenges	to	legitimacy	
brought	about	by	these	policies.	Challenges	to	legitimacy	can	be	brought	about	by,	for	example,	a	
highly	stringent	import	policy	or	currency	rationing,	or	the	opposite:	forced	opening	of	markets	to	
international	 competition.	 The	 consequences	 of	 these	 actions	 can	 be	 ill	 will	 from	 other	 state	
managers,	or	unrest	from	the	population	of	another	state.	
This	 article	 adopted	 an	 open	 Marxist	 approach	 to	 the	 state,	 upon	 which	 it	 based	 an	
understanding	of	depoliticisation.	The	 fantastical	nature	of	 social	 relations,	as	presented	 in	 this	
paper,	has	been	a	key	target	for	open	Marxists	and	those	who	study	depoliticisation	(Bonefeld	et	
al.	1992a,	xii).	This	approach	seeks	to	demystify	the	fetishized	nature	of	social	relations	as	‘thing-
like’.	The	paper	engaged	with	a	matrioshka-like	series	of	fetishized	social	relations:	it	argued	that	
‘Empire’	 is	not	a	monolithic	entity	but	a	strategy	born	out	of	the	contradictory	society	of	which	
the	state	is	a	form;	the	Sterling	Area	is	not	an	institution	but	a	tool	through	which	the	British	state	
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managed	a	number	of	imperial	relationships;	politics	and	economics	are	not	separate	categories	
but	an	ideological	conceit	through	which	class	struggle	is	channeled.		
The	paper	highlighted	the	importance	of	understanding	the	inherent	and	constant	tension	
between	politicization	and	depoliticization	and	how	it	manifests	in	the	relations	between	states.	
Saul	Marshall’s	plan	to	‘weaponise’	Singapore’s	exchange	controls	might	as	well	read	as	his	plan	
to	 politicize	 them,	 showing	 that	 a	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation	 is	 not	 a	 holy	 grail	 for	 state	
managers.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 historically	 specific	 and	 conditioned	
circumstances.	As	noted	by	Burnham	(2014,	204)	‘depoliticisation	strategies	remain	an	important,	
yet	 inherently	 contradictory,	 element	 in	 the	 armoury	 of	 state	 managers	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
preservation	of	individual	governments	and,	in	principle,	of	the	capitalist	form	of	the	state	itself.’	
For	British	state	managers,	a	key	aspect	of	successfully	managing	the	Sterling	Area	after	
the	 Second	 World	 War	 was	 through	 placing	 its	 political	 character	 at	 one	 remove	 from	 the	
international	economic	policies	that	crafted	it.	This	becomes	apparent	from	the	reaction	of	British	
state	managers	 to	Marshall’s	attempt	 to	politicise	 the	exchange	control	 laws	 that	provided	 the	
legal	basis	 for	 the	Sterling	Area	as	a	 currency	bloc.	Marshall,	 despite	 realizing	his	position	as	a	
relative	 non-entity	 in	 imperial	 politics,	 was	 still	 able	 to	 highlight	 the	 political	 character	 of	 the	
Sterling	Area	through	his	actions.		
While	this	paper	has	focused	mainly	on	British	state	managers	in	their	efforts	to	maintain	
a	 historic	 strategy	 of	 imperialism	 through	 its	 depoliticisation,	 there	 is	 another	 story	 to	 be	 told	
about	the	goals	of	Malayan	and	Singaporean	state	managers.	State	managers	in	the	Federation	
of	 Malaya	 were	 eager	 to	 maintain	 the	 status	 quo;	 however,	 whether	 this	 was	 because	 they	
accepted	 the	 arguments	made	by	British	 state	managers	or	 if	 they	 too	wanted	 to	displace	 the	
political	 character	 of	 British	 imperial	 is	 unclear	 from	 National	 Archives	 documents.	 Certainly,	
however,	Saul	Marshall’s	considered	goal	was	to	politicise	British	imperialism.	This	points	to	the	
dynamic	 nature	 of	 imperial	 relations	 and	 how	 important	 historical	 enquiry	 is	 to	 the	 study	 of	
imperialism.	 As	 Marx	 ([1867]	 1975,	 179)	 famously	 remarked,	 though	 talking	 about	 the	 capital	
relation,	 imperialism	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 or	 transhistorical	 phenomenon	 but	 one	 that	 is	 highly	
contingent	 and	historically	 specific.	Historical	 study	 of	 such	 episodes	 in	British	 imperial	 history	
reveals	 the	 contested	 nature	 of	 imperial	 relations:	 they	 are	 fraught	with	 tension,	 contradiction	
and	conflict	but	also	collaboration	and	cooperation.	While	Federation	state	managers	were	happy	
to	 accept	 Britain’s	 arguments,	 Saul	 Marshall	 was	 only	 made	 more	 determined	 by	 them.	
Understanding	their	respective	positions	cannot	be	intuited	solely	by	reference	to	capitalist	social	
relations	 but	 through	 the	 detailed	 historical	 study	 of	 the	 internal	 politics	 of	 these	 states,	 their	
relationships	with	each	other	and	with	the	global	economy.	
	 As	Gallagher	&	Robinson	(1953,	15)	note,	the	politics	of	empire	is	not	just	about	expansion	
or	conquest	but	also	the	management	and	assimilation	of	existing	territories	into	maintaining	the	
circuit	of	capital.		Gallagher	&	Robinson	(ibid.,	3)	also	note	the	implications	of	their	argument	for	
rejecting	 a	 substantial	 distinction	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	 empire.	 This	 point	 has	
consequences	 for	 two	 further	 groups	 of	 literature:	 Global	 Governance ix ,	 and	 the	 New	
Imperialismx.	Both	maintain	that	the	state	has	reduced	considerably	its	scope	in,	respectively,	the	
management	 of	 the	 global	 economy,	 and	 the	 business	 of	 empire.	 This	 paper	 has	 made	 the	
argument	that	the	role	of	one	state	in	the	management	of	the	economy	of	another	state	can	be	
obfuscated	through	the	use	of	a	strategy	of	depoliticisation.	Undoubtedly	then,	in	two	groups	of	
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literature	which	deal	with	this	very	phenomenon,	it	is	worth	reconsidering	the	role	the	state	plays	
in	both.	
	 1	
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